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Abstract
When people estimate a numeric value after judging whether it is larger or smaller than a high or low anchor value
(comparative question), estimates are biased in the direction of the anchor. One explanation for this anchoring effect is that
people selectively access knowledge consistent with the anchor value as part of a positive test strategy. Two studies (total
N = 184) supported the alternative explanation that people access knowledge consistent with their own answer to the
comparative question. Specifically, anchoring effects emerged when the answer to the comparative question was
unexpected (lower than the low anchor or higher than the high anchor). For expected answers (lower than the high anchor
or higher than the low anchor), however, anchoring effects were attenuated or reversed. The anchor value itself was almost
never reported as an absolute estimate.
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Introduction
In a classic experiment, participants were asked whether the
percentage of United Nations member states that are African is
larger or smaller than a given number (the anchor value), which
was ostensibly determined by spinning a wheel of fortune [1].
Later participants were asked to estimate the exact percentage of
African UN member states. Regardless of the anchor values’
arbitrary nature, participants’ absolute estimates were assimilated
to it: If the anchor was 10, participants’ mean estimate of the true
value was 25, if the anchor was 65, their mean estimate was 45.
Such assimilation of a numerical estimate toward a previously
presented figure is called an anchoring effect. It was demonstrated
in various domains, including knowledge questions [2–3], prob-
ability estimates [4], price estimates [5], sentencing decisions [6],
and judgments about one’s own behavior [7]. The effect is stable
over time [8] and independent of participants’ motivation [9] or
expertise [10].
A common paradigm for studying anchoring effects uses a two-
question sequence. First, the anchor is presented as part of a
comparative question (e.g., ‘‘Is the Eiffel Tower higher or lower
than X meters?’’). A second question asks them for an absolute
estimate (e.g., ‘‘What is the exact height of the Eiffel Tower?’’).
Typically, participants’ absolute estimate is shifted in the direction
of the anchor value ‘‘X’’.
In this article, we first discuss existing explanations for the
anchoring effect [11]. We then argue that an important – but
previously ignored – aspect of the questioning sequence is
participants’ answer to the comparative question. In two studies,
we empirically demonstrate that the answer to the absolute
question depends on the answer to the comparative question.
Conceptual Explanations
The anchoring effect was explained as a result of inadequate
adjustment from a starting point: Participants start with the anchor
value and adjust their estimate until a plausible value is reached;
the adjustment is usually insufficient, resulting in a biased estimate
[1]. A second explanation stresses rules of conversation [12]:
Participants assimilate their estimate to an experimenter-provided
anchor value because they expect the experimenter to be a
cooperative communicator who presents plausible anchor values
that are near to the correct answer. A third explanation is numeric
priming: Large (vs. small) anchor values make large (vs. small)
numbers more accessible in memory [13].
The fourth account, which is currently accepted as a sufficient
explanation for the effects of anchors, is the selective accessibility
model [3,14]. The authors distinguish two processes: hypothesis-
consistent testing and semantic priming. Accordingly, participants
test the hypothesis that the critical value equals the anchor value,
and generally prefer hypothesis-consistent testing [15]. If, for
example, the comparative question reads, ‘‘Is the annual mean
temperature in Germany higher or lower than 20uC?’’, it may be
obvious to test the hypothesis that the temperature is indeed 20uC,
rather than any other hypothesis [3]. During hypothesis testing,
participants are assumed to generate information that is compat-
ible with the idea that the anchor value is correct. This
information will thus be selectively more accessible and will be
used for estimating the absolute value [16].
In addition to the anchor value itself, the selective accessibility
model also considers the wording of the comparative question.
Authors proposed that the comparative question ‘‘Is the river Elbe
longer than 890 kilometers’’ would lead to a positive testing strategy
in which participants generate knowledge consistent with the idea
that the Elbe is indeed longer than 890 km. Conversely, the
question ‘‘Is the river Elbe shorter than 890 kilometers’’ would lead
participants to generate knowledge consistent with the idea that
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e86056
the Elbe is indeed shorter than 890 km [3]. The results supported
this prediction, showing higher estimates in the ‘‘longer’’
conditions than in the ‘‘shorter’’ conditions, over and above the
typical anchoring effect. In the case of non-directional compar-
ative questions, however (e.g., ‘‘Is the river Elbe longer or shorter
than 890 km’’), authors assume that participants test the hypoth-
esis that the target is equal to the anchor [3].
A Neglected Variable: The Answer to the Comparative
Question
Surprisingly, a variable that has received little attention in the
anchoring paradigm is participants’ answer to the comparative
question. Given that participants are asked to decide whether the
target value is smaller or larger than the anchor value, it seems
implausible that they test the hypothesis that the target value is
exactly equal to the anchor. In fact, the only value that
participants should not consider to be correct is the anchor value
itself, because the comparative question ‘‘Is the value smaller or
larger than X?’’ precludes the possibility that the value is exactly
equal to ‘‘X’’. Therefore, participants should rarely, if ever, report
the anchor value as the correct answer to the absolute question.
Instead, absolute estimates should be distributed around, but
exclude, the anchor value. Participants should generate informa-
tion that is compatible with their own answer to the comparative
question.
Despite this plausible link between the answer to the compar-
ative question and the answer to the absolute question, most
studies on the anchoring phenomenon fail to report the
distribution of answers to the comparative question, except of
two studies [3,17]. Although the link between the answers to both
questions was not reported in either study, both reported the
percentage of unexpected answers to the comparative question. Such
are answers that estimate the true value to be even lower than the
low anchor, or even higher than the high anchor. Interestingly, the
percentage of unexpected answers was higher than would be
expected based on the distribution of absolute estimates in pilot
studies where no comparative questions had been asked. Authors
explained this by assuming that an anchoring effect may already
have occurred while participants answered the comparative
question, and that a subsequent adjustment process would thus
not be necessary for an anchoring effect on the absolute judgment
to emerge [17]. In contrast, we argue that an adjustment process is
necessary. Participants are informed by the wording of the
comparative question that the anchor value must be wrong
(although perhaps near to the correct value) and have to decide in
which direction the correct value deviates from the anchor. Once
they have decided this by answering the comparative question
(‘‘the correct value is lower/higher than the anchor’’) the direction
of adjustment is determined. Participants should generate further
information that is consistent with their own answer to the
comparative question instead of the anchor value itself. As a
consequence, the answer to the absolute question will almost
always be consistent with the answer to the comparative question
(as was the case in a previous study) [17].
This means that anchoring effects on the absolute question
should generally be more pronounced for people who give
unexpected answers to the comparative question by assuming that
the true value is even more extreme than the anchor value (i.e.,
higher than the high anchor or lower than the low anchor). By
contrast, for people who give expected answers to the comparative
question by assuming that the true value is less extreme than the
anchor value (i.e., lower than the high anchor or higher than the
low anchor), anchoring effects should be attenuated. If anchor
values are relatively close to the true value, anchoring effects may
even reverse for those people who give expected answers to the
comparative question.
In two studies we used general knowledge items as the target
estimates. To present anchor values in Study 1, we used
nondirectional comparative questions. In Study 2, we used
directional comparative questions of the type ‘‘Is the river Elbe
longer than 693 kilometers?’’ [3]. In both studies, we first
analyzed the consistency of answers to the absolute question; we
predicted that most answers would be in line with the answer to
the comparative question. Second, we predicted that an overall
anchoring effect would emerge, with high anchors leading to
higher absolute estimates than low anchors. Third, and most
important, we predicted that the size and direction of the
anchoring effect would be qualified by participants’ self-
generated answers to the comparative question: A clear-cut
anchoring effect would be obtained for participants who give
unexpected answers to the comparative question; for partici-
pants who give expected answers to the comparative question,
the anchoring effect would be attenuated or, in the case of less
extreme anchor values, reversed. To test the latter prediction,
we varied the distance of anchor values from the means of non-
anchored pilot estimates.
Study 1
Method
Ethics statement. Procedures were approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Sports Science at the
University of Bielefeld. Following recommendations by the Ethics
Committee, all participants provided oral informed consent, which
was ensured and documented by the experimenter. We did not
obtain written informed consent in order to protect participants
anonymity.
Participants. Participants were 106 student volunteers from
the University of Bielefeld (mean age = 23.95 years; SD=8.74).
The study’s alleged aim was to optimize the wording for general
knowledge questions.
Materials. The questionnaire contained 25 knowledge items,
including 6 from other authors [14]. Based on absolute estimates
from a pilot study (N= 45; see Table 1), four questionnaire
versions were produced. To vary the distance between anchor
values at two levels, high and low anchor values were set at either 1
SD or 0.5 SD above and below the pilot study mean, respectively.
Answers to the comparative question could thus be unexpected
(lower than the low anchor or higher than the high anchor) or
expected (higher than the low anchor or lower than the high
anchor). Item content was counterbalanced with high versus low
anchors: In one condition 12 items were paired with a low anchor
and 13 with a high anchor; in the other condition this pairing was
reversed.
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly as-
signed to the conditions of a 2 (distances of the anchor values:
low, high)62 (content versions) experimental design. They
completed the questionnaire in a laboratory with 1 to 5 people
present at any one time. For all 25 items, participants first
answered a comparative question (e.g., ‘‘Was the first Beatles LP
published before or after 1964?’’) by marking one of two response
options (e.g., ‘before’ or ‘after’). Then they answered the respective
absolute question (e.g., ‘‘In which year was the first Beatles LP
published?’’) by writing their response in an empty space. After
completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and
received a chocolate bar.
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Results
Preliminary analyses. We first analyzed the distribution of
extreme answers to the comparative question in relation to the
pilot results. Because anchor values were set at 1.0 SD or 0.5 SD
below and above the mean value, expected percentages of extreme
answers (‘‘higher than the high anchor’’ or ‘‘lower than the low
anchor’’) – assuming a normal distribution – were 15.87 and
30.85, respectively. The percentages of extreme answers we
observed in Study 1 were 27.12 in the 1.0 SD condition and 37.48
in the 0.5 SD condition. Thus, in line with previous findings
[3,17], we observed a higher percentage of extreme estimates than
would be expected based on pilot data. This result suggests that an
anchoring effect may indeed occur already when people answer
the comparative question.
In a second step we analyzed answers to the absolute question in
relation to the respective comparative question. We distinguished
between consistent, inconsistent, and anchor estimates. For
example, if a participant answered the comparative question
‘‘Was the first Beatles LP published before or after 1964?’’ by
selecting ‘‘before,’’ any estimate below 1964 would be consistent,
any estimate above 1964 would be inconsistent, and an estimate of
exactly ‘‘1964’’ would be an anchor estimate. The number of
estimates given was 2650 (106 participants625 items). Of these,
2577 (97.25%) were consistent, 47 (1.77%) were inconsistent, 23
(0.87%) were missing values, and only 3 (0.11%) exactly equaled
the anchor value.
Test of anchoring effects on the absolute
estimates. Absolute estimates were averaged across items after
being z-transformed based on item-wise distributions. To test our
hypotheses, we computed four scores for each participant: the
mean of all absolute estimates combined with low anchors in
which the answer to the comparative question was as expected
(i.e., higher than the low anchor), the mean of all absolute
estimates combined with high anchors in which the answer to the
comparative question was as expected (i.e., lower than the high
anchor), and the analogous means for unexpected answers to the
comparative question (i.e., where the response was lower than the
low anchor and higher than the high anchor, respectively).
We conducted a 2 (anchor distance: large vs. small)62 (low vs.
high anchor)62 (expected vs. unexpected answers) analysis of
variance with repeated measures on the second and third factor.
(The content factor – i.e., which items were paired with low or
high anchor values – produced no effects and was thus dropped.)
Means are shown in Table 2. Overall, the anchoring effect was
significant (Mhigh anchor = .49 vs. Mlow anchor =2.57), F (1,
104) = 1080.22, p,.001. Furthermore, the anchoring effect was
larger when the distance between anchors was large (Mhigh
anchor = .68 vs. Mlow anchor =2.81) rather than small (Mhigh
anchor = .33 vs. Mlow anchor =2.36), as indicated by a significant
interaction effect between anchor value and anchor distance, F (1,
104) = 142.64, p,.001.
Most importantly, the anchoring effect was qualified by the
answer to the comparative question, F (1, 104) = 551.12, p,.001.
Supporting our central hypothesis, the anchoring effect was large
and in the expected direction only when the answer to the
comparative question was unexpected (Mhigh anchor = 1.02 vs. Mlow
anchor =21.07), t(105) = 26.91, p,.001. However, when the
answer to the comparative question was in the expected direction,
the anchoring effect was absent (Mhigh anchor =2.03 vs. Mlow
anchor =2.08), t(105) = 0.94. No other main or interaction effects
reached significance. Nonetheless, simple effects of the anchor
condition at each level of anchor distance by answer to the
comparative question are displayed in Table 2.
Table 1. Pilot study (N = 45): Means and standard deviations
of knowledge items.
Item Mean Std. Dev.
1 Height of Mount Everest (m) 7222 2190
2 Length of a blue whale (m) 18 13
3 Length of the river Mississippi (km) 1186 871
4 Age of Mahatma Gandhi when he died 73 13
5 Number of bones in human body 180 82
6 Length of the river Elbe (km) 393 300
7 Albert Einstein’s first visit to USA (year) 1926 15
8 Elevation of city of Ulm above sea level (m) 235 205
9 Leonardo da Vinci’s year of birth 1636 175
10 Year of first Beatles LP 1962 4
11 Yearly beer consumption per
head in Germany (l)
89 68
12 Columbus in America (year) 1541 106
13 Age of Goethe when he died 60 15
14 Publication year of Freud’s
‘‘Interpretation of Dreams’’
1905 25
15 Temperature inside a cigarette (uCelsius) 410 355
16 Height of Cheops Pyramid (m) 154 90
17 Number of inhabitants of Malta 259,525 226,317
18 Martin Luther’s theses (year) 1572 119
19 Melting point of iron (uCelsius) 812 423
20 Beethoven’s year of birth 1773 68
21 Men’s long jump world record (cm) 859 89
22 Weight of men’s discus (grams) 1802 1025
23 Vincent van Gogh’s year of birth 1781 114
24 Year of formation of the UNO 1952 10
25 Number of European Union
member states since 2004
23 5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086056.t001
Table 2. Estimates by Anchor Condition, Anchor Distance,
and Answer to Comparative Question (Study 1).
Answer to Comparative Question
Expected Unexpected
Anchor Distance from Pretest Meana
Anchor
Condition 0.5 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD
High Anchor 20.15 0.11 0.81 1.24
Low Anchor 0.11 20.28 20.83 21.34
Difference: High
minus Low
20.26 0.39 1.64 2.58
t-Test for
Differenceb
24.18 5.72 21.13 25.73
Cohen’s d 20.94 1.29 4.04 5.39
aNumber of cases for the 0.5 SD and 1 SD anchor distance conditions was 56
and 50, respectively.
bAll t-tests were significant (p,.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086056.t002
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Discussion
Replicating earlier studies [14], we observed an anchoring
effect, and this effect was larger when the distance between
anchors was large rather than small. More importantly, we
demonstrated for the first time that absolute estimates strongly
depend on answers to the comparative question. Clear-cut positive
anchoring effects were observed only for those participants who
gave unexpected answers to the comparative question, judging the
true answer to be lower than the low anchor, or to be higher than
the high anchor. This pattern supports our assumption that people
access information consistent with their own answer to the
comparative question, rather than with the anchor value itself.
When that answer was ‘‘lower’’ (‘‘higher’’), participants seemed to
access information that was consistent with low (high) values. For
participants who gave the expected answers to the comparative
question, judging the true answer to be higher than the low
anchor, or to be lower than the high anchor, the anchoring effect
was attenuated or, when the distance between the two anchors was
small, even reversed.
Furthermore, participants almost never reported the exact
anchor value as their absolute estimate. If the answer to the
comparative question was ‘‘lower’’ (‘‘higher’’), the absolute
estimate was generally consistent with a lower (higher) value. This
result is difficult to reconcile with the assumption of a positive test
strategy in which participants test the hypothesis that the anchor
value itself is correct. Instead, the result supports our hypothesis
that participants’ own answer to the comparative question primed
different informational contents, which in turn influenced their
absolute estimates.
Finally, we fully replicated the result [17] that the amount of
unexpected or extreme answers is greater than would be expected
based on pilot estimates. These findings support authors conjec-
ture that an anchoring effect may occur already when people
answer the comparative question.
Study 2
In our second study we tested the relevance of the answer to the
comparative question for another assumption of the selective
accessibility model. It was argued [3] that the wording of the
comparative question may influence the test strategy people use
and thus the kind of information that comes to mind. Accordingly,
a question like ‘‘Is the river Elbe longer than 543 kilometers?’’
would facilitate a positive test strategy that leads participants to
generate information consistent with a longer river. Conversely,
the question ‘‘Is the river Elbe shorter than 543 kilometers?’’ would
lead to the generation of information consistent with a shorter
river. As a result, absolute estimates should be higher in the
‘longer’ condition than in the ‘shorter’ condition [3].
Replicating this design, we varied the directional wording of the
comparative question. However, we again hypothesized that the
answer given to the comparative question would strongly moderate
the size of the anchoring effect, independent of any effect of
question wording. For example, answering the question ‘‘Is the
Elbe longer than 543 km?’’ with ‘‘no’’ should make similar
information cognitively accessible as answering the question ‘‘Is
the Elbe shorter than 543 km?’’ with ‘‘yes’’, and should thus
produce largely equivalent results. Furthermore, we analyzed the
amount of consistent and inconsistent absolute estimates, as in
Study 1.
Method
Participants. Participants were 78 student volunteers from
the University of Bielefeld (mean age = 22.71 years; SD=5.92).
The study’s alleged aim was to optimize the wording of general
knowledge questions.
Materials. We used the same 25 items as in Study 1, and
item content was again counterbalanced with anchor condition.
High (low) anchor values were set to either 0.5 SD or 1.0 SD
above (below) the pilot mean. A new independent variable was the
wording of the comparative question, which was varied such that
an affirmative answer would imply a value that was either higher
or lower than the anchor. For example, in the high anchor
condition the item about the river Elbe read either ‘‘Is the Elbe
shorter than 543 kilometers?’’ or ‘‘Is the Elbe longer than 543
kilometers?’’ (response alternatives: ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’). Absolute
questions were the same as in Study 2, for example ‘‘How long is
the Elbe?,’’ with an open space in which participants could write
their answer.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 1.
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of the 2
(content versions)62 (anchor distance: low vs., high)62 (wording:
higher vs. lower) design.
Results
Preliminary analyses. Expected percentages of extreme
answers to the comparative question were again 15.87 and
30.85, respectively, for the 1.0 SD and 0.5 SD conditions. The
observed percentages, however, were 33.25 in the 1.0 SD
condition and 40.05 in the 0.5 SD condition. Again, an anchoring
effect thus seemed to occur already when participants answered
the comparative question [17].
Authors of the selective accessibility model predicted a positive
test strategy whereby participants test the hypothesis that the
information given in the wording of the comparative question (e.g.,
‘‘Is the Elbe shorter than 543 kilometers?’’) is correct [3]. This
would lead to more ‘‘yes’’ answers than ‘‘no’’ answers. In the
present study, the percentage of ‘‘yes’’ answers was 48.82, whereas
the percentage of ‘‘no’’ answers was 49.96 (1.49% missing values).
A tendency to say ‘‘yes’’ was thus not found.
In the next step we analyzed the distribution of absolute
estimates in relation to answers to the respective comparative
question. Absolute estimates could again be consistent or
inconsistent. If, for example, one says the Elbe is longer than
543 km (‘‘yes’’), any estimate above 543 is consistent with the
answer to the comparative question. Among the 1950 absolute
estimates, we found 1746 (89.54%) to be consistent and 96 (4.92%)
to be inconsistent; answers were missing 44 times (2.26%), and the
exact anchor value was estimated 64 times (3.28%). This latter
percentage was higher than that observed in Study 1, which may
be due to the fact that answering the absolute question with the
exact anchor value is not in conflict with the answer ‘‘no’’ in the
comparative question. If one answers the question ‘‘Is the Elbe
longer than 543 km’’ with ‘‘no’’, the Elbe can be either shorter
than 543 km or exactly 543 km long. Estimating the exact anchor
value thus contradicts the answer to the comparative question only
if that answer was ‘‘yes’’. Such conflicting estimates were given
only 5 times (0.26%).
Test of anchoring effects on the absolute estimates. As
in Study 1, composite indices across items were computed after z-
transforming all absolute estimates. For each participant, four
values were computed: the mean of all answers to questions
combined with low anchors in which the answer to the
comparative question was as expected (‘‘value is higher than low
anchor’’), the mean of all answers to questions combined with high
anchors in which the answer to the comparative question was as
expected (‘‘value is lower than high anchor’’), and the analogous
means for unexpected answers to the comparative question (‘‘value
Anchoring Revisited
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is lower than the low anchor’’; ‘‘value is higher than the high
anchor’’).
Counterbalancing of item content again produced no effects, so
this factor was dropped. For analyzing absolute estimates, we
conducted a 2 (anchor distance: large vs. small)62 (wording: lower
vs. higher)62 (low vs. high anchor)62 (expected vs. unexpected
answers) mixed analysis of variance with repeated measures on the
third and fourth factor. Means are shown in Table 3. The
anchoring main effect was replicated (Mhigh anchor = .45 vs. Mlow
anchor =2.52), F (1, 74) = 752.37, p,.001. Again, the anchoring
effect was larger when the anchor distance was large (Mhigh
anchor = .61 vs. Mlow anchor =2.70) rather than small (Mhigh
anchor = .28 vs. Mlow anchor =2.33), as indicated by a significant
interaction effect of anchor condition and anchor distance, F(1,
74) = 103.28, p,.001.
Most importantly, we again obtained an interaction effect of
anchor condition and answer to the comparative question, F (1,
74) = 247.05, p,.001. As predicted, the anchoring effect was
larger when answers to the comparative questions were unexpect-
ed (Mhigh anchor = .89 vs. Mlow anchor =2.87), t (77) = 23.76,
p,.001, than when they were expected (Mhigh anchor = .01 vs.
Mlow anchor =2.17), t (77) = 2.45, p,.05. In case of a low anchor
distance and expected answers to the comparative question, the
anchor effect was again reversed (see Table 3 for simple effects of
anchor condition within combinations of the other factors). No
main or interaction effect of wording was found, all F,1.
Discussion
In contrast to the argumentation and findings of [3], we found
no evidence for a test strategy effect in the direction suggested by
the comparative question. Instead, answers of ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ to
that question were equally frequent. The wording of the
comparative question (‘‘Is the Elbe longer vs. shorter than
543 km?’’) in itself also did not affect absolute estimates. Instead,
the overall anchoring effect, which was again replicated, was once
more strongly qualified by answers to the comparative question. In
the case of low anchor distances, an anchoring effect occurred only
when the answer to the comparative question was unexpected,
whereas it reversed when that answer was expected, replicating the
pattern found in Study 1.
Extreme answers to the comparative questions again occurred
more often than would be expected by chance. An anchoring
effect thus seemed to be present already in answers to the
comparative question [17].
General Discussion
If people are asked to estimate a numerical value and do not
know the correct answer, they are influenced by an anchor value
that is presented before in a comparative question. The most
elaborate explanation for this effect is the selective accessibility
model [3,14], which holds that participants first try to verify the
hypothesis that the anchor is correct when answering the
comparative question, and then, in a second step, use anchor-
consistent information to answer the absolute question.
Taking the selective accessibility model as a starting point, we
presented the hypothesis that people’s answers to the comparative
question have a decisive impact on their subsequent cognitions. In
most studies to date participants’ answers to the comparative
question had been completely ignored. But even when the
distribution of answers to the comparative question was reported,
these answers were not included as a predictor of answers to the
absolute question [3]. If a person decides that the exact value is
smaller than a low anchor (or larger than a high anchor), only
values that are more extreme than the anchor are likely to be
considered as possible results of the absolute estimate. The search
for information is thus restricted to content that is compatible with
such extreme values, and will thus contribute to a large anchoring
effect. The situation is different for a person who, more correctly
or expectedly, decides that the true value is larger than a low
anchor or smaller than a high anchor. Now, only values that are
less extreme than the anchor are likely to be considered as possible
results of the absolute estimate. The search for information is
restricted to content that is compatible with such less extreme
values, and will thus contribute to an attenuated anchoring effect,
or even a reversal of the anchoring effect if anchor distances are
small.
Table 3. Estimates by wording, anchor condition, and answer to comparative question (Study 2).
Answer to Comparative Question
Expected Answers Unexpected Answers
Anchor Distance from Pretest Meana
0.5 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD
Wording of the Comparative Question
Anchor Condition Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher
High Anchor 2.18 2.23 .10 .33 .74 .78 .98 1.06
Low Anchor .02 .08 2.39 2.35 2.72 2.68 21.08 2.99
Difference: High minus
Low
2.20 2.31 .49 .68 1.46 1.46 2.06 2.05
t-test for Differenceb 21.74+ 22.61* 4.44*** 7.24*** 8.64*** 15.13*** 21.59*** 13.87***
Cohen’s d 20.62 21.09 0.69 2.58 4.71 2.78 4.82 5.23
aNumber of cases was 21 in the wording ‘‘lower’’ condition, and 17 in the wording ‘‘higher’’ condition in the 0.5 SD condition and 20/20 in the 1 SD condition.
b+ p,.10;
*p,.05;
***p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086056.t003
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In two studies, we found unequivocal support for this new
hypothesis: Anchoring effects generally replicated, but their
magnitude and even direction were qualified by answers to the
comparative question. These results can specify one of the
explanations [1] that participants start at the anchor value and
adjust insufficiently. More precisely, some participants decide to
adjust in the wrong direction and others in the correct one. If one
only considers the mean values for high and low anchor
conditions, insufficient adjustment appears to occur. If, however,
one considers the means separated in expected and unexpected
answers to the comparative question, anchor effects are absent
following the expected answer to the comparative question. The
‘‘insufficiency’’ is thus not due to the amount of adjustment but
due some people’s starting out in the wrong direction.
In contrast to the assumption of the selective accessibility model
that participants positively test the hypothesis that the anchor
value is correct, the anchor value was almost never reported as the
true value in absolute estimates. Instead, participants seem to test
the hypothesis that their own answer to the comparative question
is correct. If one gives the answer that a value is larger (smaller)
than a given anchor, search of further information is restricted to
values that are larger (smaller) than the anchor. Nonetheless, the
results are in line with the assumption that participants believe that
the anchor value is not totally wrong and that the correct value has
to be near the anchor. This restatement would be compatible with
the selective accessibility model and with the explanation that
participants expect the experimenter to present plausible infor-
mation [12].
The effect of the answer to the comparative question was
independent of that question’s directional wording. According to
the selective accessibility model, the variation in wording used in
Study 2 should have induced different test strategies in line with its
direction (‘‘is the value lower than X’’ versus ‘‘is the value higher
than X’’). However, we did not observe any effect of question
wording on the absolute estimates, but again a strong moderating
effect of participants’ answer to the comparative question,
regardless of its wording. Taken together, our findings imply that
the wording of the comparative question is influential only in
combination with the answer to that question. If one says ‘‘yes’’ to
the question of whether a value is larger than x, further
considerations are restricted to larger values. If one says ‘‘no,’’
the true value can be either lower than or equal to the anchor
value. The answer to the absolute question always seems to be a
consequence of the answer to the comparative question.
These observations shift our focus to the question of what
determines the answer to the comparative question itself. Our
analysis of the distribution of unexpected answers showed that
unexpected answers were more frequent than would be expected
by chance. These findings support a conjecture [17] that
anchoring may occur already at the stage where participants
answer the comparative question. However, our reasoning is not
in line with their assumption that a subsequent adjustment process
toward the true value takes place. Instead we assume that the
wording of the comparative question forces participants to adjust
their absolute estimates away from the anchor in the direction
(higher or lower) they decided while answering the comparative
question.
Our findings may have implications for judgments in natural
contexts, given the pervasive importance of social comparisons
[18]. Many everyday situations resemble the current paradigm in
that people often ponder (and answer) a comparative question
before coming up with an exact estimate of a numeric value. For
example, a judge or jury may first consider whether the
prosecutor’s demand is too high or too low, and only later
determine a sentence. Research should thus routinely consider the
role of answers to initial, anchor-related relative questions as a
possible co-determinant of later judgments.
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